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   MAXWELL AFB AL S J PREJEAN 18 APR 88 ACSC-88-2160

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TITLE The Evolution of the United States Transportation Command, 1978-1987: Can Unification Solve the Problems?

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    This paper traces the development of the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) from Exercise Nifty Nugget 78, through the experience with the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA), to the creation of the new command.

    The paper examines the problems uncovered in the exercise and examines why the JDA was not able to fix them. After looking at the arguments for and against unification, we will finally attempt to project the answer to the question: "Can Unification Solve the Problems?"

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On 1 October 1987 at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, Air Force General Duane H. Cassidy, Commander-in-Chief of the Military Airlift Command (CINCMAC), took on an important new responsibility; one which could change the face of American military transportation and the way in which the Department of Defense mobilizes and deploys its forces worldwide.

In a ceremony presided over by Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cassidy became the first Commander-in-Chief of the new United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). (4:53) For the first time in our history, all common-user strategic transportation elements of the Department of Defense--The Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC), the Army's Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), and the Air Force's Military Airlift Command (MAC) would come under the same operational command. (5:1199)

This paper will examine just how this historic reorganization of the Defense Transportation System (DTS) came about. Beginning with the Joint Chiefs of Staff-sponsored Exercise Nifty Nugget 78, to the experiment with the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA), through President Reagan's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, and finally to the creation of the new command, we will trace the development of USTRANSCOM.

We will begin by examining the background, assets, and missions of the three major commands involved. Next, we will look at exercise evaluations relating to exercise Nifty Nugget, which pointed to serious deficiencies in our nation's ability to mobilize effectively. Then we will look at the JDA, examining some of the reasons it was unable to solve those problems. We will then look at the transition from the JDA to USTRANSCOM, examining several arguments pro and con. Finally, we will attempt to extrapolate on those arguments and perhaps predict the new command's impact on the Department of Defense's ability to rapidly mobilize and deploy its assets in response to a global threat.

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In future years, American military forces may have to respond to crises as near as Central America or as distant as the globe permits. Hopefully, at the end of this paper, we will have a better idea whether the new USTRANSCOM will get us there.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Sidney J. Prejean has spent his entire
commissioned career in the Military Airlift Command.
Following graduation from Undergraduate Navigation Training
and C-141 Upgrade Training in 1976, he was assigned to the
438th Military Airlift Wing, McGuire AFB, NJ. During his
six years with the 438th MAW, he held positions as disparate
as Assistant Chief of Wing Public Affairs, 18th Military
Airlift Squadron Executive Offi er, Wing Combat Tactics and
Techniques Navigator, and 18 MAS Chief of Navigator
Standardization. He was an Instructor Navigator in the
Primary Nuclear Airlift Force, and later a Flight Examiner
Navigator in Aerial Refueling and Visual Airdrop.

In 1982, Major Prejean was assigned to the 435th
Tactical Airlift Wing, Rhein-Main AB, Germany, where he
served as an Airlift Duty Officer and Emergency Actions
Controller in the Rhein-Main Consolidated Command Post. In
the aftermath of the 1983 bombing of the Marine Barracks in
Beirut, Major Prejean directed the airlift of all injured
and deceased Marines from the Middle East, through Germany,
to the United States.

After two years in Germany, he was transferred to RAF
Mildenhall, UK, where he served initially as an Airlift Duty
Officer in the 313th Tactical Airlift Group Airlift
Coordination Center. He was later selected to be the Chief,
Combat Plans, for that organization. In that capacity, he
was the sole MAC point of contact in the United Kingdom for
WINTEX-CIMEX 87, a world-wide, civilian/military command and
control exercise.

Major Prejean holds a Bachelor of Science in Political
Science from the University of Scranton (Pa) and a Masters
of Science in International Relations from Troy State
University. He is a 1972 graduate of both MAC's Airlift
Operations School and Squadron Officer School in residence.
A 1985 graduate of Air Command and Staff College Seminar
Program, he is a member of the ACSC Resident Class of 1988.

Major Prejean is a Senior Navigator with 3019 hours in
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Service Medal (1OLC), the Air Medal, the Air Force
Commendation Medal (1OLC) and the Department of Defense
Humanitarian Service Medal.

He is married to the former Dr Janet E. Leigh of
Woolley, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom.

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"insights into tomorrow"

REPORT NUMBER   88-2160

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR SIDNEY J. PREJEAN, USAF

TITLE The Evolution of the United States Transportation Command, 1978-1987:   Can Unification Solve the Problems?

On 1 October 1987 General Duane H. Cassidy, Commander-in-Chief, Military Airlift Command, became Commander-in-Chief of the new United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), America's newest unified command. This paper will trace the nine-year evolution of the new unified command and seek to answer the question of whether unification of the Department of Defense's Transportation Operating Agencies (TOA) will make the DOD more able to mobilize and deploy American forces.

In 1978, the Department of Defense sponsored a nationwide mobility and deployment paperwork exercise called Nifty Nugget 78. The exercise uncovered major deficiencies

both in the way the services planned for mobilization and deployment and in the way they executed said operations.

As a result of that exercise, the Joint Chiefs of Staff created the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA), a multi-service organization which was tasked with coordinating both the planning and execution of mobility and deployment for the DOD. The new agency would also implement the Joint Deployment System (JDS), an automated data processing (ADP) system which would bring both planning and execution into the real-time arena. It became clear rather early on that the JDA did not have the authority necessary to straighten out the problems uncovered in Nifty Nugget, primarily in the areas of ADP and command authority.

After several years of study, both by the Legislative and Executive branches, the President decided to unify all DOD transportation commands--The Air Forces's Military Airlift Command, the Navy's Military Sealift Command, and the Army's Military Traffic Management Command--into one functionally-oriented unified command, the United States Transportation Command.

This paper will conclude by reviewing the problems uncovered in Nifty Nugget 78 and examining the proposed solutions offered by USTRANSCOM. In doing so, we hope to begin to answer the question of whether unification can solve the problems.

Chapter One

THE BACKGROUND

To understand the impact that this new organization might have on the future mobilization efforts of the Department of Defense, it might be illustrative to look at the pre-existing situation in general terms. In this chapter, we will look at the transportation operating agencies (TOA) of the three major commands, their missions and resources. We will see what each is able to contribute to the structure of national mobilization efforts. And we will see how each provides one leg to the Defense Transportation System (DTS). (9:4)

The United States Army's Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) is the "first leg of the strategic mobility triad." (10:28) Headquartered at Falls Church, Virginia, the command, "is responsible for identifying and managing the transportation routes to be used in the United States for shipment of supplies to the ports." (15:40) As such, it is the action agent for the Secretary of the Army relative to his responsibility for transportation management within the DOD. (10:28) In accomplishing this mission, MTMC "manages freight movement in the continental United States (CONUS) and. . . DOD worldwide Personal Property Movement and Storage Program." (19:32) The command, then, generally acts as an interface agent between and among land, sea, and air modes of transportation.

While MTMC actually operates some 42 seaports throughout the world (19:32), it does not, like its sea and air counterparts, own a large transportation fleet. "The only transportation mode it possesses is a fleet of specially designed rail cars to carry tanks and other equipment." (15:40) MTMC also "monitors the nation's transportation infra-structure," tracking "the status of seaports, inland waterways, pipelines, and airports," for the DOD Highways and Railroads for National Defense Programs. (10:28) The MTMC Commander, Maj Gen John H. Stansted, has 11,000 total personnel in his command; 800 military and 10,200 civilian, contract, and carrier personnel. (4:55)

The Army's MTMC, then, is literally what its name implies, a management and coordination organization, concerned primarily

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in wartime with the coordinated effort of moving military
materiel from its point of origin to various air- and sea-ports
throughout the CONUS. (10:28)

The US Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC) is far more
than a transportation coordinating agency. From its
headquarters in Washington, D.C., the MSC is charged to
"provide sealift for strategic mobility in support of national
security objectives." (10:25) This mission, to actually
operate a lift command, is accomplished through three primary
forces, "strategic sealift, Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force and the
Special Mission Support Force." (19:32)

The hardware involved is impressive. In addition to the
some 150 MSC-manned ships which the command operates in support
of the Navy's own daily mission, the MSC has "earmarked 51
additional ships for joint deployment," including nine dry
cargo ships, 22 general purpose oil tankers, eight fast sealift
ships, and 12 prepositioning ships located throughout the
world. (15:40) The MSC's fleet and special mission support
ships are manned by approximately 3,700 civil service
crewmembers, with the U.S.-flagged civilian fleet operated by
some 2,015 non-governmental civilians. (6:25) In time of war,
the MSC Commander, Vice Adm Walter T. Piotti, Jr., could
additionally supplement his fleet with the short notice
activation of 116 vessels currently in the Ready Reserve Fleet.
(15:40) This manpower and personnel pool provides the MSC with
"the capacity to deploy and sustain military forces whenever
and wherever needed, as rapidly and for as long as operational
requirements dictate." (19:32)

While the Navy may indeed provide sustainability in global
deployment with its seaborne fleet, for truly rapid deployment
of America's military might, the Department of Defense must
call on the airlift forces of the Military Airlift Command
(MAC). MAC is responsible for several absolutely critical
wartime lift functions. In addition to its charge as the
single management agency for all Department of Defense airlift,
MAC, from its Scott AFB, IL headquarters, will run aeromedical
evacuation for the wounded, aerospace search and rescue
operations, special operations interface with other services,
aerospace weather services, and audiovisial combat
documentation. (19:32)

It is in the arena of strategic airlift and deployment,
however, that MAC, with its 93,000 active duty and civilian
employees, will provide yeoman duty. (4:55) Its strategic

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airlift fleet is large and growing. In wartime, as in peacetime, the Commander-in-Chief, MAC (CINCMAC), would retain operational control over some 234 C-141B Starlifters and 77 C-5A Galaxies. (15:40) Both are four-engined jets capable of carrying a wide variety and mix of cargo and troops, and both are air-refuelable for extended deployment range. The additions to that fleet will come both from the current program to purchase 50 brand-new C-5B aircraft, and the projected development and deployment of the C-17, further adding to both the size and flexibility of MAC's strategic airlift fleet. In addition to these MAC owned-and-operated aircraft, the Secretary of Defense can, in time of war or national emergency, activate the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). (9:10) This activation would provide the CINCMAC immediate use of nearly 250 additional large airframes, from DC-8s to B-747s, configured both for cargo and passenger use, which are owned and operated by American flag carriers. (15:40) While even with total CRAF activation, the volume capacity of the MAC fleet cannot approach that of the MSC, airlift has the real advantage of true immediacy, a key element in modern force projection. (9:4)

These, then, are the three major commands which comprise the Defense Transportation System. Combining land, sea, and air assets, as well as management of port interface areas, they would truly carry the load in case of American national mobilization or DOD force deployment, large or small. How they perform together to rapidly deploy American military power in support of American national objectives could be the determining factor in whether we achieve those objectives.

Though these commands have, since their inceptions, operated separately from each other, with none firmly involved in each other's planning process, their joining together is not a new idea. As early as 1949, the idea was making the rounds of the Pentagon. (5:1199) It would take a major exercise in 1978 and, literally, an Act of Congress, to make that idea a reality.

Chapter Two

NIFTY NUGGET 78

Mobility and deployment--the ability of the United States
to marshall its military resources and project them to any spot
around the globe--are key elements of national power which are
tested virtually every time the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
task a military exercise. (11:3) From the massive European
deployment involved in the Reforger series of exercises to the
paperwork command and control exercises of the Vintex-Cimex
exercise set, mobility and deployment are tested, actively or
passively, each time a major military exercise is held. To
augment this sometimes incidental testing, the Department of
Defense (DOD), in conjunction with other government agencies,
conducts a biennial exercise specifically designed to test our
national abilities in the key areas of mobility and deployment.
(11:3) The exercise conducted in 1978, Nifty Nugget, was to
provide the impetus for a major change in the way the DOD, the
JCS, and the Defense Transportation System (DTS) went about the
business of mobilizing and deploying our nation's military
might.

Exercise Nifty Nugget was, in fact, part of a three-
exercise series co-sponsored by the Office of Secretary of
Defense (OSD), the JCS, and the Federal Preparedness Agency
(FPA). (11:3) [NOTE: The Federal Preparedness Agency has since
become part of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
and no longer exists as a separate organization. (11:3)] Each
sponsoring agency was responsible for a separate exercise which
would test, on paper, the ability of different types and levels
of governmental agencies to respond to different phases of a
national mobilization scenario.

Before examining each separate exercise, we should first
be conversant with the common exercise scenario. While each
exercise would approach it from a different direction, each
shared a common "story line." The situation upon which each
exercise was based was the simulation of "a fast-breaking
conventional attack in Europe" by the combined forces of the
Warsaw Pact. (5:1199) This scenario was developed because,
"[w]hile such a scenario might not be the most likely case, the
penalty for being unprepared is so great that the U. S. must
plan for such a possibility." (11:3) Such a no-notice,
lightning-quick attack would eliminate a tremendous American
resource--long-term national industrial mobilization--and

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constrain the US to the use of "forces-in-being", with no
opportunity to upgrade our strategic reserves. (11:3) The
"scenario was the most stressful its designers could devise--a
bolt-from-the-blue attack by the Warsaw Pact on NATO forces in
Europe." (8:42) In other words, we would be fighting the enemy
on his terms, at the time and place of his own choosing.
Because of the complexity and pace of the exercise, it provided
the opportunity to evaluate several different agencies of the
federal government at several different levels on an almost
real-time basis at several different stages of mobilization and
deployment.

The first exercise of the series to take place was
sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Exercise
Petite Nugget 78 was a one-day exercise (7 October 1978)
wherein senior military and civilian officials would review
planning options available in advance of actual mobilization.
(11:4) Its objectives included: providing the opportunity for
those senior officials to familiarize themselves with pre-
mobilization options; illustrating the need for more
sophisticated mobilization planning; and illustrating how
readiness could be improved given a period of political
warning. (11:4)

The second exercise in the series was exclusively civilian
in scope, and was sponsored by the FPA. Exercise Rex 78 lasted
three weeks, from 10 October through 30 October 78, and was
designed to test purely civilian inter-agency cooperation and
coordination. Its objectives included: testing civilian "plans,
procedures, systems and support for military mobilization and
initial deployment"; testing management of vital national
resources involved in such a deployment; and identifying short-
and long-term shortages in those resources. (11:4) It would
also evaluate civilian agency-DOD cooperation in a mobilization
situation. (11:4)

The final exercise, and the one with which we are most
concerned, was exercise Nifty Nugget 78. Sponsored by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Nifty Nugget ran concurrently with Rex
78, at the same stages of the scenario throughout. (4:54) This
was the purely military aspect of the exercise series, although
as the entire series of exercises had the specific purpose of
evaluating mobilization and deployment, "the simulated
warfighting portion was subordinate to mobilization and
deployment situations." (11:4) Among the exercise objectives
of Nifty Nugget were: "to determine the adequacy of plans,
systems, and procedures for full mobilization"; "to

examine limitations and shortfalls in manpower and logistics during the initial phases of mobilization and deployment"; and "to assess the effectiveness of deployment planning." (11:4) The demanding scenario would provide the real test of all those objectives.

At the termination of the three-week simulated war, the results were clear. The reaction of the participants was summed up in one sentence by the then-Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Robert Kromer, "It proved we couldn't mobilize." (15:40) What had been intended to have been "a no-fault exercise that would pinpoint problems for remedial action," turned out to be something quite different. (8:42)

According to the exercise report prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Nifty Nugget made salient the fact that the existing mobilization plans were a hodgepodge of old and unconnected Presidential emergency orders, policies, regulations and procedures." (11:8) Operations plans which would be key to any large deployment were found to be wildly inaccurate, ". . . rapid reinforcement of NATO called for Army reserve units which lacked 'personnel, equipment and training'" for their taskings. (8:42) Planners had consistantly 'assumed away' large shortfalls in Prepositioning of Material Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) and War Readiness Material (WRM), critical items for both the Army and the Air Force in the event of conventional war in Central Europe. (8:42)

The shortages in both manpower and material were compounded by major disconnects in the planning for strategic transportation. Because no one had prioritized each supported Commander-in-Chief's (CINC) requirements, the JCS had overtasked total strategic airlift capacity by some 300 percent--the system would have ground to a halt. (8:42) "[W]hen several regions had to be implemented simultaneously, aircraft had to be re-allocated; collectively, these plans called for many more aircraft than could be available." (11:16) Shortages and shortfalls in strategic transportation assets were not, however, limited to airlift. The sufficiency of sealift assets, too, were suspect. While the Military Sealift Command could call on the Ready Reserve Fleet in actual mobilization, the exercise evaluation report called these "limited assets" in the critical "initial days of mobilization." (11:17)

Another key problem involved the very planning and execution systems which were required for rapid, effective

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deployment. Any change in deployment requirements could result in large scale turmoil. An attempt to change the configuration of a Marine unit bound for Iceland, "wrecked the entire mobilization computer system," according to Undersecretary Kromer. (15:40) "[T]he automated planning system could not provide a list of the units in a light (Marine) brigade, and then forgot to inform the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic, of the change." (8:42)

The planning and deployment system was shown to be particularly resistant to the type of short-notice change which would be demanded by this scenario were it really to happen. According to the exercise evaluation, "This lack of flexibility causes unacceptable delays in the movement of units and supplies and inefficient use of strategic airlift assets." (11:16) Uncoordinated taskings throughout the exercise caused immense redundancy of effort, further bogging down the transportation system. "In one case, airlifters received 27 validated requests to move the same unit to 27 different places." (4:54)

Many of the problems which surfaced could and should have been expected. The scenario was designed to be demanding, but "even (the exercise) designers were somewhat taken aback by how neglect had soured mobilization capability." (8:42) Running throughout all the problems seemed to be a common thread--no one person or agency was in charge of deployment planning and mobilization. The Joint Chiefs realized that they simply had to bring the planning process under control. "To fix the problems revealed in Nifty Nugget, we established the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA)," said General Duane Cassidy. "We gave it the responsibility for integrating our procedures for executing major deployments." (5:1199) Whether this new agency, by "integrating our procedures," could bring together all these loose parts into a coherent whole would remain to be seen.

Chapter Three

THE JOINT DEPLOYMENT AGENCY

The need for some sort of coordinating organization for national mobilization and deployment was mentioned in the Nifty Nugget Exercise Evaluation. "...until Nifty Nugget, no agency had been charged with integrating the planning of the TOAs (Transportation Operating Agencies) into a single traffic management system." (11:16) Even General David C. Jones, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted the shortfall in his Fiscal Year 1980 Military Posture Statement, "The Nifty Nugget results have confirmed my judgment that we have a great deal of work to do in order to update our near-term capability to mobilize, deploy and sustain our combat forces." (16:50)

Much had to be done, and with the results of Nifty Nugget fresh in their minds, it did not take the Joint Chiefs of Staff long to develop what they hoped would be a solution to the problem. Immediately after the exercise, "the Commander-in-Chief, United States Readiness Command (USCINCRED), was tasked by the JCS Chairman to develop an organization to improve our Nation's capability to deploy and sustain mobilized combat forces." (7:8) As a result of USCINCRED's efforts, the JCS was able to create the new Joint Deployment Agency as early as March 1979, less than six months after the major problems had surfaced. (2:15-16)

The new organization would take advantage of expertise already possessed by the Department of Defense. Its headquarters would be at MacDill AFB, Fla, where it would be collocated with the United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM) (16:50) This collocation would take advantage of USREDCOM's 18 years of experience in "planning for deployment of CONUS-based Army and Air Force general-purpose combat forces," dating back to USREDCOM's 1961 creation as successor to U.S. Strike Command. (16:50) The mere collocation, however, would not alone pass that experience. The top three officers of the new JDA; the Director, the Vice Director, and Chief of Staff, were 'dual-hatted' from equivalent positions in USREDCOM. (7:8-9) Additionally, 10 senior members of the USREDCOM staff moved full-time to the JDA, and an additional 110 staffers dual-hatted along with their commander. (16:50) Augmenting this experienced core would be an additional 126 officers and enlisted members of all services. (16:50)

As many of the problems noted in Nifty Nugget 78
related to the planning aspect of mobility and deployment,
that would become the JDA's primary charter. With the Nifty
Nugget exercise results as a starting position, and the
expertise of USREDCOM to point the right direction, the JDA
went to work in three separate areas--deliberate planning,
plans maintenance, and time-sensitive planning and
execution. (13:1-3)

The first step in any deployment planning is the
deliberate stage. "In the deliberate, or peacetime,
planning process, the Joint Chiefs of Staff task a [theater]
commander with developing plans to meet national security
objectives." (2:16) In developing these plans, the theater
commander must deal extensively with all members of what can
be called the joint deployment community. "In the broadest
sense, [this] encompasses all levels of command and
governmental agencies, such as the National Command
Authority, The Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Service staffs, unified and specified commands, and
other agencies." (13:2) The mission of the JDA in
deliberate planning was to 'jump right in', to provide "a
single point of contact" for all agencies involved in this
initial planning process. (7:8)

This interaction would be accomplished by the JDA at a
series of plans refinement conferences, wherein the theater
(or planning) commander sits down with representatives from
the joint deployment community. (2:16) At these planning
conferences, the participants would compare the plan's
deployment data base with further data about forces,
equipment, supplies, and transportation assets. "The
conference process in effect changes a notional plan into an
actual assessment of capability." (2:16)

The process comes in two phases. In Phase I, accurate
information about the real availabilty of troops, supplies,
and equipment is developed for transportation planners. In
preparation for Phase I, personnel planners check tasked
units to assure that they are in fact the correct ones, and
that they are correctly trained, equipped, and manned.
Logisticians check supply and resupply plans for
sustainability. Each participant checks his own area of
expertise so that actual movement planning may begin with

the correct data. (13:3) This coordinated and correct data
is submitted to the Transportation Operating Agencies (TOAs)
in the form of Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD).
This computerized list tells that TOAs the 'what and when'
to plan for. (13:2)

In Phase II of the refinement process, the TOAs are
able to refine movement schedules based upon availability of
transportation modes. They will adjust movement
requirements where possible to resolve transportation
shortfalls and conform to existing transportation
capabilities. (13:3) In this phase, the transporters can
select and develop the best mode and route for most
effective deployment. "For instance, the Alaska Plan, which
originally called for forces to deploy to Alaska through the
Port of Savannah via the Panama Canal, was improved by re-
routing troops and materiel overland to the Port of Seattle
and thereafter by sea to destination." (2:16) This planning
refinement process will provide a truer picture of what the
theater commander needs, where he needs it, who will provide
the support, when it can be delivered, and by what means.
That picture, developed by the JDA, would provide a solution
to many of the problems surfaced in Nifty Nugget. That, at
least, was the intention.

To keep track of these plans, and to facilitate changes
to them, a new system of data automation was created--the
Joint Deployment System (JDS). The JDS, a massive computer
system integrated into the Worldwide Military Command and
Control System (WWMCCS) Intercomputer Network (WIN) was to
become "the central repository of deployment data. It
contains all real-world and exercise operations plans
(OPLANS)." (17:1) In addition to the general planning data,
the JDS stores "up-to-date planning data on the first five
days of airlift and the first 30 days of sealift for each
plan." (2:16) The JDS can be accessed throughout the joint
deployment community, and because "[a]ll JDS sites use
identical software and the same data base structure," system
maintanance, and data reception speed are improved, memory
is increased, and all data bases are synchronized. (17:1)
At least that was the plan. Because this data base is
computerized and readily accessable, plan maintenance is
also much easier. With the JDS, the JDA could now
theoretically review the data base on a regular basis to
ensure that major data elements for deploying forces and
equipment are valid and in order. (2:18) With
computerization, a much wider range of information can be

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maintained in accordance with the real world situation.
"This plan maintenance concept will provide for 'living'
plans rather than documents which only gather dust between
planning revisions." (7:9) The system, with its universal
data base and capability for real-time situational updates,
allows, for the first time, coordinated deployment planning,
both deliberate and time-sensitive.

It would be in time of crisis, however, when the JDA
and the JDS would truely come into their own. "In times of
tension or crisis, the JDA becomes the focal point for the
deployment community." (13:4) Often little time is
available for developing proposed courses of action, and
several plans may have to be melded into one contingency
plan. "The JDS now bridges the gap between deliberate
peacetime planning and time-sensitive planning and execution
for an imminent or evolving crisis." (13:3) As a crisis
approaches or develops, "commanders use data from the joint
deployment system relating to forces and movement
characteristics." (2:16) Throughout a crisis, from force
selection, through deployment tasking, to final plan
execution, the JDS gives commanders at all levels access to
current, accurate information about forces available and the
means to get them where they are needed.

If the Joint Deployment Agency and the Joint Deployment
System represented giant steps in mobility and deployment
planning, major problems still existed. The first problem
was basic--command. "The JDA cannot finish the job,"
according to General Duane H. Cassidy. "We did not give it
the authority to direct corrective actions from the
unified/specified CINCS or from the Transportation Operating
Agencies." (5:1199) The Navy agreed, "The JDA has never had
power over the commands, and has been ineffective as a
result." said Ed Krochalis, MSC's deputy director of plans.
(15:40) USAF Colonel Franklyn Selzer, chief of the
Strategic Mobility Division, Logistics Directorate, JCS,
commented, "There was nothing absolutely wrong with the way
each of the three commands [MAC, MSC, MTMC] did its job.
The problem was when you tried to integrate them. JDA's
fatal flaw was there was lots of service parochialism.
(15:43)

The lack of central command authority compounded
problems with the JDS. "The system never worked as
advertised, partly because the JDA lacks the authority to
force the services to give it the information it needs."

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(15:43) The lack of a common data base was not the only
problem the JDS faced. According to a Government Accounting
Office (GAO) report compiled in 1986, JDA had achieved no
agreement on types of information required for the JDS or on
methods of computer interface between and among the various
commands and agencies served. Indeed, the GAO found that
the services used a total of 14 different computers for
deployment planning, and that JDS would interface with only
six. (15:44)

    Major strides had been made through the JDA, but it
became clear that it just would not solve several root
problems. Into the mid-1980's, the argument about combining
the three Transporation Operating Agencies into a unified
transportation and deployment agency continued to a
resolution. We shall next look at some of those arguments,
pro and con, and see how that resolution brought us to where
we are today.

Chapter Four

TRANSITION: JDA TO USTRANSCOM

If it was generally agreed among the members of the
joint deployment community that the Joint Deployment Agency
was not to solve all their problems, there was certainly no
unanimity as to what the proper solution should be. It was
clear that the JDA as constituted could not pull together
all the services and their transportation planning elements,
and it was equally clear that the JDA would not be able to
make the Joint Deployment System into the all-in-one
computer system which would be required for the massive
coordinated effort. The question became one of reform or
replacement.

As early as 1981, the Department of Defense became
concerned about the real efficiency of the new JDA. The
Department commissioned the Joint Chiefs to study the
situation and develop recommendations. The Chiefs realized
that the current system was, in general, a compromise.
"While well intentioned, the result has been a disjointed
system that cannot adequately perform the function for which
it was intended." (15:45) The solution recommended by the
Chiefs was the consolidation of two of the three DOD
transportation commands, MSC and MTMC. (3:44) While the
proposed merger would only include docks and not operational
control of ships, lights and bells went off, particularly
within the Department of Navy. Then-Secretary of the Navy
John F. Lehman, Jr. became concerned that the Navy would, in
fact, lose control of its operational transportation assets.
It took some two years, but in 1983, largely because of his
efforts, language was inserted into that year's Defense
Authorization Bill which specifically prohibited a formal
merger of the two commands. (15:45)

Efforts continued, however, to merge all the Department
of Defense transportation operating agencies along the lines
of the Hoover Commission Report of 1949 (4:54) and the 1955
Second Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government. (18:1) Beginning in the early 1980's, the
topic was studied by President Reagan's Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management. This group was
established by the President and given broad charter to
study the entire Department of Defense. (6:41) It would
develop recommendations which, while not having force of

law, could serve as a basis for either public law or executive action by the President. Its findings relative to the transportation community were clear: "The Secretary of Defense should establish a single unified command to integrate global air, land and sea transportation, and should have flexibility to structure this organization as he sees fit. *Legislation prohibiting such a command should be repealed.* " [Emphasis mine] (12:38)

Coincident with the studies of the Presidential Commission, the United States Congress was studying the same problems. No less a friend of the Defense community than Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) was conducting hearings on what was to become the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (Public Law 99-433). In these hearings, service opposition to unification again boiled to the surface. Principal among the opponents was, again, Navy Secretary Lehman. He was concerned that the unification of the three services' transportation elements would create a useless bureaucratic nightmare. "To take the Military Sealift Command and put it out in Illinois under an Air Force Commander has to be taking the process of reorganization for its own sake to an absurd extreme." (15:44)

The Army was equally opposed to the proposed unification. Retired Army Maj. Gen. Hank Del Mar, former Commander of MTMC, foresaw an objectivity problem with the subordination of all transportation assets under one service. "The commander of TransCom (sic) should be a traffic manager. He should not be saddled with the parochialism and prejudice of being the manager of one mode." (15:45) Then-Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. P. X. Kelley, suggested delay. He felt that a civilian think tank might help solve the problems--and possibly save dedicated Marine sealift assets from joint use. (15:44)

These Pentagon officials were, apparently, swimming against the tide. Following all the testimony, both pro and con, the Goldwater-Nichols Committees created their reforms. Specific among them was the repeal of the Lehman-engineered 1983 prohibition against unification--legislation called for by the Packard Commission. (20:2211) The way was now clear for unification, and unification is what happened.

In April, 1986, the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219 directed the Secretary of Defense to

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"establish a single, unified command to provide global air, land, and sea transportation." (18:1) Subsequently, on April 15, 1987, the Secretary of Defense established the framework for the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and in June of that year President Reagan nominated General Duane H. Cassidy, CINCMAC, as the first CINCUSTRANSCOM. (19:32) The command was activated in ceremonies at Scott AFB, IL on 1 October 1987, ushering in a time-phased program which will have it fully functional by a target date of October 1990. (1:26)

The new command will have as its three components the services' transportation commands--MAC, MSC and MTMC. Additionally, it will absorb the disestablished JDA and assume responsibility for all Department of Defense strategic mobility planning. (19:32) As part of its planning function, USTRANSCOM will be responsible for the development of an automated data processing (ADP) master plan to create a user-oriented system responsive to the needs of supported and supporting CINCs. (5:1199)

That's quite a full plate, putting one command--and one commander--in charge of all planning and execution of all mobility and deployment functions for the Department of Defense. While only time will tell if it will work, we will next attempt to project the impact of the new command on the problems exposed in Nifty Nugget 78.

Chapter Five

THE FUTURE

        While only time will tell whether the creation of the
unified United States Transportation Command will usher in a
new era of greater efficiency and effectiveness in
mobilizing and deploying our nation's military might,
perhaps we can deduce something of an answer from the
information we have covered thus far. From the exercise
results of Nifty Nugget 78, we know where we started from.
And from the experience with the Joint Deployment Agency, we
know what initial steps were taken to improve the situation.
What we must now ask is whether, given those initial
problems and tentative solutions, the USTRANSCOM will, in
fact, go beyond the JDA and solve the problems surfaced in
1978.

        In this chapter, we will discuss the two major problems
uncovered in Nifty Nugget: lack of a command structure in
mobility and deployment planning; and lack of effective
automated data processing (ADP) support throughout the
planning and execution cycle. We will take each problem
separately, and discuss why the JDA failed to solve them.
With each problem, we will attempt to apply the remedy of
USTRANSCOM. Finally, we will discuss some doctrinal and
operational questions whose answers may have direct bearing
on the future effectiveness of the new command.

        The first problem we address is that of command. We
have seen the situation which existed in 1978. The exercise
report refers to the "hodgepodge" of data (11:8), nothing
which could properly be called a coordinated plan. There
was simply no one in charge of mobility and deployment. The
creation of the JDA, and specifically the position of
Director, JDA, was a step in the right direction. For the
first time, there was a major military organization which
had as its charter the planning of national mobilization and
deployment--with a four-star general as its head. The
problem was, that general was not granted the authority to
fully accomplish his mission. A joint task force assigned
by the JCS to study the problem in 1986 found, "a lack of
authority within the Joint Deployment Community (JDC) for
one command to direct corrective action or intervene
effectively when required." (18:2) General Cassidy, the new
CINCUSTRANSCOM, agrees, "it was an agency with coordinating

authority only--so it reached a level beyond which it could
not go without authority to direct the TOAs or unified and
specified commanders in chief to take corrective actions,
keep data bases current, or adhere to milestones." (4:54)
CINCUSTRANSCOM will have no such problems. He will, first
of all, have operational command over all transportation
assets in the Department of Defense. (19:32) And as a
unified command CINC, with an operational chain of command
running directly from the National Command Authority (NCA)
through the JCS (18:3), he will have the 'clout' to
accomplish what has to be done. The creation of the
USTRANSCOM will solve the command problem in the mobility
and deployment community.

     What, then, of the other major problem, automated data
processing support? We saw the system break down in Nifty
Nugget, with no coordinated data base and lack of real-time
responsiveness. And we saw the attempted fix, the Joint
Deployment System. For all the positive aspects of the JDS,
its shortcomings were numerous. Lack of interface between
and among the various commands' hardware systems and lack of
a coordinated data base were the primary problems.
Compounding these problems, and perhaps slowing their
solution, was the aforementioned command problem. If the
creation of USTRANSCOM has solved that problem, let us now
look at the steps being taken to solve the ADP problem.

     Even before the USTRANSCOM came on line, a new phase in
the USAF WWMCCS information system (WIS) modernization plan
had begun. (15:44) The upgrade of the JDS to a new system,
the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES)
was, to an extent, underway. (4:57) Unfortunately,
budgetary problems and interservice coordination problems
had put that system somewhere into the future. (15:44) The
creation of the new command may provide the impetus to get
that hardware update back on track. In developing a new ADP
system for mobility and deployment planning, USTRANSCOM has
a distinct advantage--the MAC ADP system. It is considered
one of the best anywhere, and it will serve as a model for
the new system. (3:42) The new command is already hard at
work on this critical task. The CINCUSTRANCOM has
established an ADP working group made up of members of his
service components, the Department of Transportation, the
Defense Communications Agency, and the Air Force System
Command's Electronic Systems Division. (4:57) This is not a
mission taken lightly by the command. USAF Colonel David S.
Hinton, USTRANSCOM Chief of Staff has said, "If we do

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nothing more than pull off the consolidation of ADP efforts
under one command, we will have justified our existence and
have saved the American taxpayers untold dollars." (3:42)

The new CINCUSTRANSOM has also asked the question of
whether his new command can solve the problems. Realizing
that abstract thought will never answer that question, he
has asked the Joint Chiefs to 'recreate' Nifty Nugget in
1989. A similar exercise, with the nature of the threat
updated, could provide a new "baseline" from which to
measure our nation's ability to mobilize and deploy its
forces. (4:58)

It would be unfair, however, to leave the reader with
the impression that the situation is unbroken sweetness and
light. There are several questions about the new command,
both doctrinal and operational, unanswered at this time,
which could have direct bearing on the command's success.
Secretary Lehman raised a valid point in Congressional
hearings when he mentioned "reorganization for its own
sake." (15:44) We can also ask, is this 'unification for
its own sake?' Currently, jointness and unification seem to
be almost the faddish bywords in the Department of Defense.
We have long had unified commands, such as the United States
European Command (USEUCOM), which were geographically based.
But the creation of USTRANSCOM, along with the new United
States Special Operations Command (USSOC), takes us down the
road of unification based on function, or result. Will we
one day join USAF A-10s, Marine Harriers, and Army attack
helicopters in a unified United States Tank Killing Command?
We must be careful that, in seeking greater efficiency
through unification, we do not undermine the effectiveness
of separation. Generals Arnold and Spaatz fought too long
and hard for a separate Air Force for it to be smothered
under a blanket of unification.

There is also the operational question, specific to the
Military Airlift Command (MAC), about its change of status
from a specified command to a componant command within
USTRANSCOM. (3:40) As a specified supporting CINC, CINCMAC
had previously kept operational command and control over the
strategic leg of his airlift diad, while the tactical leg
CHOPs (changes operational control) to a supported
(unified) CINC in time of war. Now, those roles are not so
clear. In General Cassidy's words, "The commander in chief
of the U S Transportation Command is the supported commander
in chief for the transportation aspects of mobility

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planning, but is the supporting commander in chief when
providing mobility capability to the other combatant
commanders." (4:56) The status of the Military Airlift
Command within that new arena is a situation which will
require further definition before the success of USTRANSCOM
can be assured.

So, we have looked at our nation's status relative to
mobility and deployment, beginning with Exercise Nifty
Nugget 78. And we have seen the tremendous problems which
faced planners as a result of that exercise. Next, we
examined the attempted remedy, the Joint Deployment Agency,
and we have examined its shortcomings. Finally, after
reviewing the arguments pro and con, we have seen the
creation of the United States Transportation Command. In
examining this new command relative to the problems which
preceded it, perhaps we have come some distance in answering
the question, "Can unification solve the problems?"

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